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A B S T R A C T
Previous research has shown that with reduced attention at encoding, false recognition of critical lures for
negative arousing DRM lists were higher than positive arousing lists. The current study extends this research to
examine the role of attention for both arousing and non-arousing valenced false memory formation. Further, due
to contradictory ﬁndings in past research, we examined attention at encoding using both within- (Experiment 1)
and between- (Experiment 2) participants design. Participants were exposed to high and low arousing, valenced
DRM lists under full and reduced attention conditions. Experiment 1 revealed that only negative arousing false
memories were not aﬀected by reduced attention at study, all other false memories decreased. In Experiment 2,
although recognition of negative high arousing critical lures was higher, false memories increased in the reduced
attention condition for all list types. Diﬀerences in attention during encoding aﬀect the retrieval of emotional
stimuli dependent on arousal and valence, however, our decision strategies can override the impact of this when
it comes to retrieval.
Research has shown that, compared to non-emotional stimuli,
emotional stimuli are preferentially attended to and processed, in-
creasing the likelihood of successful memory retrieval (Kaestner,
Wixted, & Mednick, 2013; Kensinger, 2009). Understanding this eﬀect
is not only theoretically important but also has more applied implica-
tions in clinical and forensic psychological literatures (Brown, Lloyd-
Jones, & Robinson, 2008; Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Watts, Buratto,
Brotherhood, Barnacle, & Schaefer, 2014).
Research has shown that emotion-enhanced memory is driven by
both the valence and arousal intensity of stimuli. In this context, va-
lence can either be a pleasant appetitive/approach reaction or an un-
pleasant aversive/withdrawal reaction to stimuli. Arousal reﬂects the
intensity (low, high) with which these two motivational systems are
activated by stimuli (Kaestner et al., 2013; Lang & Bradley, 2010).
Diﬀerences between both components of emotional experience are re-
ﬂected in behavioral data showing that arousing (in particular nega-
tive) stimuli typically show mnemonic advantages over non-arousing
and neutral stimuli. In contrast, positively and negatively valenced
stimuli tend to be better remembered than neutral stimuli, even when
the arousal intensity of the emotional stimuli is relatively low (Kang,
Wang, Surina, & Lü, 2014; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Kensinger &
Schacter, 2006; Talmi, Schimmack et al., 2007).
For false memories, it seems reasonable to assume that emotion-
enhanced veridical memories would be accompanied by a decrease in
memory errors for emotional stimuli. However, we have now seen
several studies that indicate the opposite trend. For instance, using an
adapted version of the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), researchers have ex-
amined spontaneously generated false memories for emotional stimuli
(e.g., Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010; Budson et al.,
2006; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010). In this para-
digm, participants are presented with word lists (e.g., table, sit, seat,
couch, desk…) that are highly associated with nonpresented words or
critical lures (e.g., chair). In a subsequent memory test, critical lures are
often falsely recalled or recognized as being part of the originally pre-
sented lists. Remember judgements are often reported alongside re-
cognition responses, indicating a strong recollective experience for the
nonpresented word (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Lists are
adapted such that critical lures and list words are manipulated for va-
lence and arousal (e.g., harm, pain, wound, punish, insult [critical
lure=hurt]; hug, embrace, lips, peck, aﬀection [critical lure= kiss]).
Although results can vary depending on level of arousal and valence, it
appears that negative high arousing DRM lists increase false memory
rates, producing the familiar emotion-enhanced false memory eﬀect
(e.g., Brainerd et al., 2010; Howe et al., 2010).
There are two main theories that can account for these ﬁndings.
According to spreading activation models [e.g., Associative-activation
Theory (Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009 and Activation-
monitoring Theory (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger,
Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), with the latter model including a
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source monitoring process at retrieval], activation spreads from studied
items to related items in an associative network in memory. The acti-
vation of related but nonpresented items at encoding can contribute to
source monitoring diﬃculties, which lead adult participants to falsely
identify the remembered critical lures as being part of the original word
list. Higher false memories rates for negatively valenced, compared to
neutral, DRM lists has been attributed to the dense and highly salient
associative connections for negatively valenced information (Howe
et al., 2009, 2010; Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016). The
more connections and the fewer the number of theme nodes in a net-
work, the faster the spread and activation to the critical lure. Further,
when the stimuli also evoke arousal, it attracts attention which en-
hances memory binding (Talmi & McGarry, 2012) and increases acti-
vations to the nonpresented critical lure (Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar
et al., 2016). Such activation spreads rapidly and automatically through
this network, leading to enhanced levels of false memories.
Fuzzy-trace Theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) in contrast, draws on
the idea that there exist dual-opponent processes. It postulates that
individuals encode and store in parallel verbatim and gist representa-
tions for a list item and that these traces are held independently of one
another. Verbatim representations refer to surface-level aspects of a
word (e.g., font) and is believed to drive accurate memories. Gist re-
presentations, which are more schematic in nature (fuzzy traces), re-
present the meaning of an item and are said to drive false memory
production, especially in the absence of verbatim information (Steﬀens
& Mecklenbräuker, 2007). Brainerd and Boofkbinder (in press) have
recently argued that valenced stimuli is associated with memory
properties that increase gist and formant false memories. However, they
argue that false memory is more strongly inﬂuenced by negative than
positive stimuli. This is because, whilst valence drives up gist proces-
sing, it is only negative valence that simultaneously drives down se-
mantic properties that increase item-speciﬁc processing. Based on their
ﬁndings, they argued that arousal did not aﬀect false memory forma-
tion, but concluded that extreme levels of arousal may inoculate against
memory distortion. Even high Levels of arousal elicited from word
stimuli could only be considered moderate compared to some aﬀect-
laden situations in everyday life. Thus, based on the theoretical position
put forward by Brainerd and Bookbinder, the semantic properties of
negative valence stimuli should increase gist at the expense of item-
speciﬁc processing due to their memory properties, but if negative va-
lence were equal, arousal would not aﬀect the formation of false
memories.
For emotional stimuli, it appears that the role of relatedness is key,
but recent behavioral research has also made reference to the role of
distinct encoding processes in the production of false memories in this
paradigm. Justiﬁcation for this research comes from neuroimaging
studies that found distinct neural processes associated with the eﬀect of
valence and arousal on memory (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Kensinger
& Schacter, 2006). These studies showed that immediate emotion-en-
hanced memory for arousing (especially negative) stimuli is driven by
amygdala-hippocampus interactions, brain areas related to memory
that are less dependent on attentional resources at encoding. In con-
trast, mnemonic beneﬁts for non-arousing stimuli are due in part to
frontally mediated semantic and strategic processes that beneﬁt reten-
tion without the key involvement of the amygdala (LaBar & Cabeza,
2006). Further, it appears that positive stimuli are underpinned by
diﬀerent processes compared to negative stimuli. For instance, Mickley
Steinmetz, Addis, and Kensinger (2010) reported that amygdala eﬀer-
ents weakened as arousal increased for positive stimuli.
Several behavioral studies have supported these ﬁndings, showing
that attention mediation (i.e., attention is necessary for the enhanced
eﬀects on memory) can account for neutral, positive, and negative non-
arousing as well as positive arousing emotion but not for the eﬀects of
negative high arousing emotion on memory. That is, for negative
arousing stimuli, the enhanced eﬀects persist with little attention at
encoding (Kang et al., 2014; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Talmi,
Schimmack et al., 2007). These ﬁndings, although they are not based on
the direct measurement of neural activity, do provide behavioral data
that ﬁt with the neurocognitive ﬁndings outlined by Kensinger and
Corkin (2004). Taken together, the neuroimaging and behavioral stu-
dies suggest that memory for negatively-valenced high-arousing in-
formation persists because of the relatively automatic eﬀects of emotion
on memory via the automatic capture of attention. In comparison,
memory for positive (high and low arousing), negative non-arousing, as
well as neutral stimuli is dependent on the intentionality to encode the
information and thus, is reliant on more controlled self-generated en-
coding processes (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004).
Knott et al. (2018) and Knott and Shah (in press) used a similar
design to collect behavioral data to examine the role of attention in the
formation of emotion enhanced false memories. They exposed partici-
pants to neutral and emotionally arousing negative and positive DRM
lists under full and reduced attention conditions (random number
generation in Experiment 1 and speeded word presentation in Experi-
ment 2). Importantly, although these manipulations diﬀer in that one is
a concurrent task and the other is a change in presentation, both
methods have been shown to limit associative activations from reaching
conscious awareness in the divided attention and DRM literature
(Dewhurst, Barry, Swannell, Holmes, & Bathurst, 2007; although see
more later), and both have been used in the enhanced-emotion litera-
ture to show the eﬀect of reduced attention and role of automatic en-
coding of negative arousing stimuli. They found that under limited at-
tention conditions, false memory rates for negative stimuli were still
higher compared to those for positive as well as neutral stimuli. Hence,
their results were in line with past ﬁndings from the neuroimaging and
behavioral studies and the relatively automatic capture of attention
when processing negatively arousing stimuli. That is, enhanced false
memories for negative high arousing stimuli survived limited atten-
tional resources at encoding. Although, unlike previous behavioral
studies, they did not examine the role of attention for non-arousing
negative and non-arousing positive false memory formation, negative
arousing items could still be encoded and associates in the network
could still be activated under reduced attentional resources. In com-
parison, reduced attention hindered successful encoding and reduced
the activation of nodes within the positive arousing and neutral asso-
ciative networks. Similar inferences can be made that encoding of
arousing positive (and neutral) stimuli require more elaborate and
controlled processing.
The study by Knott et al. (2018) was the ﬁrst to manipulate emotion
when encoding DRM lists, but it was not the ﬁrst to investigate the role
of attention using the DRM paradigm. In fact, there has been some
debate over the impact reduced attention has on false memory pro-
duction. For example, Dewhurst et al. (2007) similarly argued that if
attentional resources are suﬃciently reduced to prevent the generation
of associations, critical lures will not be activated and thus, not re-
cognized as often at test. And indeed, the results of Knott et al. (2018)
and several other studies (e.g., Dewhurst et al., 2007; Knott &
Dewhurst, 2007) are in line with these predictions and show that false
memory rates are generally lowered under reduced, compared to full,
attention conditions. However not all studies that have manipulated
attention at study have shown a reduction in false memory. Otgaar,
Peters, and Howe (2012, for adults), Pérez-Mata, Read, and Diges
(2002) and Peters et al. (2008) all found that various divided attention
tasks at study increased false memory using the DRM paradigm. Here, it
has been argued that divided attention undermines the encoding of
distinctive perceptual and contextual features of semantic-related
words at encoding, reducing the ability to successfully monitor and
reject critical lures.
How can we reconcile these ﬁndings? First, Dewhurst et al. (2007)
argued that if a task, although cognitively demanding, does not divide
attention throughout the entirety of the presentation, it will not prevent
the generation of associates. For example, Seamon, Luo, and Gallo
(1998) found that a digit monitoring task (rehearsing a digit sequence
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shown before the list items for a subsequent test) did not reduce false
recognition. Although this was cognitively demanding, spontaneous
generation of associates could still occur during presentation.
Second, there is a relatively consistent diﬀerence in outcome due to
experimental design. That is, from the research we have reviewed that
manipulates attention using the DRM paradigm, false recognition rates
are lower when attention is manipulated with-participant, but it seems,
higher when attention is manipulated between-participants. For ex-
ample, Seamon et al. (1998) found that false recognition of critical lures
in the DRM paradigm was only lowered by a reduction in attentional
resources when their reduced attention condition (presentation speed of
words at encoding: fast vs. slow) was manipulated within-participant
(Experiment 2). When attention/speed was manipulated between-par-
ticipants (Experiment 1), levels of false recognition did not diﬀer be-
tween reduced and full attention conditions. Further, Otgaar et al.
(2012, for adults), Pérez-Mata et al. (2002) and Peters et al. (2008) all
used a between-participants manipulation of attention and found an
increase in false memory formation. Dewhurst et al. (2007), Knott and
Dewhurst (2007) and Knott et al. (2018), by comparison, manipulated
attention within-participant and found the reduction in false memories
discussed earlier. Although Seamon et al. (1998) argued methodolo-
gical diﬀerences in their study (number of lists per condition), it could
be that the diﬀerence lies in the decision strategies adopted at test. In a
between-participants design, participants may set a low threshold for
accepting an item as old after a divided attention condition because
they know words would be less familiar to them. In order to increase
the probability of accurately recognizing a word, they adopt a more
liberal criterion. In a repeated measures design, where participants are
tested on items that were presented in full and divided attention con-
ditions, their decision criteria remain the same for all items and fewer
critical lures are considered familiar because they do not meet the more
conservative threshold for recognition. Dewhurst et al. (2007) used a
criterion eﬀect to also explain the diﬀerence in false recall and re-
cognition when using a divided attention task. All things being equal,
they found that false responses to critical lures increased when parti-
cipants completed a recall task, but decreased when they completed a
recognition task. The recall task was conducted after each list pre-
sentation and they argued that participants had the opportunity to
change their criterion threshold in what they perceived as more diﬃ-
cult conditions.
When examining the eﬀects of reduced or divided attention at en-
coding, one should consider the impact of experimental design. Of
course, Seamon et al. (1998) and other similar research did not ma-
nipulate emotion in their list sets and because Knott et al. (2018) only
used a repeated measures design, it raises the question of whether
emotion-enhanced false memories would survive a criterion shift at test
in a between-participants design and whether any shift would super-
sede the contributions of possible distinct neural processing in the en-
coding of emotional stimuli in the production of false memories.
To summarize, our study has two aims. First and foremost, we
aimed to replicate the enhanced-emotional false memory eﬀect ﬁrst
demonstrated by Knott et al. (2018). Based on the ﬁndings of previous
neuroimaging studies, Kensinger and Corkin (2004) proposed that
arousal and valence might play diﬀerent roles in encoding processes via
distinct neural routes. However, Knott et al. did not examine the role of
non-arousing valenced stimuli and the impact of reduced attention on
encoding. Although we do not propose to study these encoding pro-
cesses using neuroimaging methodology, we can use behavioral data to
make inferences similar to those who have manipulated attention in the
emotion enhanced memory literature. Second, we aimed to explore
some of the contradictory ﬁndings in relation to the eﬀect of attention
manipulation (and the role of experimental design) on false memory
formation and the possibility that a change in decision strategy within a
single test causes the increase or decrease in false recognition responses
that we have seen in the literature. Therefore, in Experiment 1, in line
with Knott et al., we used a repeated measures design to manipulate
attention. In Experiment 2, attention was treated as a between-parti-
cipants variable.
In line with Experiment 2 of Knott et al. (2018) and several emotion
enhanced memory studies (e.g., Kang et al., 2014; Kensinger & Corkin,
2004) in both experiments of this study, list type was manipulated as a
repeated measures variable. However, to prevent distinctiveness of
emotional items from driving the enhanced memory eﬀect in this study
(see Knott et al., 2018; Talmi, Luk et al., 2007; Watts et al., 2014), we
blocked encoding and retrieval by list type; that is, list learning and
memory retrieval of a speciﬁc emotion type occurred in separate study
and test blocks. Finally, previous research has used both secondary task
procedures (e.g., random number generation or auditory tasks) to di-
vide attention resources at encoding, and speeded presentation to re-
duce attentional resources (see Clark-Foos & Marsh, 2008; Knott et al.,
2018; Knott & Shah, in press; Seamon et al., 1998). We used this latter
method because it reduces variation in attentional resources at en-
coding (not dependent on individual performance on the secondary
task) and it was used in Experiment 2 of Knott et al.’s study with very
similar eﬀects to those observed in the secondary task condition.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Fifty members of City, University of London (36% male) aged 18–25
(M=19.74, SD=1.69) individually participated in this study for
course credit or remuneration. All participants were ﬂuent-English-
proﬁcient (86% were English native speakers). Written informed con-
sent was obtained from each participant. A priori power analysis with a
medium eﬀect size (0.25) and Power (1− err prob) of 0.80 resulted in a
sample size of 22.
Design & stimuli
This study followed a 2(Presentation Speed: 2000-ms vs. 20-
ms)× 5(List Emotion: positive high arousal vs. positive low arousal vs.
negative high arousal vs. negative low arousal vs. neutral) repeated
measures design.
DRM lists. A set of 60 DRM lists (12 negative, high in arousal; 12
negative, low in arousal; 12 positive, high in arousal; 12 positive, low in
arousal; and 12 neutral, non-emotional) was created by using the
University of South Florida free association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, &
Schreiber, 1998). The lists were constructed by selecting an emotional
or neutral target word (the critical lure) and then choosing 12 emotion-
congruent words in order of their backward associative strength to that
target word. Valence and arousal scores for the critical lures and list
words were obtained from the Aﬀective Norms for English Words
(ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). A list was only selected/created if the
following conditions were met: (1) it had at least 12 emotion-congruent
associates to the critical lure, (2) it had a mean backward associative
strength value of 0.10 or above, and (3) it had available valence and
arousal information for the critical lure. As backward associative
strength between list items and the critical lure has been shown to be
a key predictor for false memory production (e.g., Roediger et al.,
2001), the mean backward associative strength values of lists were
matched between the ﬁve diﬀerent List Emotion types (negative high
arousal lists: M=0.19; negative low arousal lists: M=0.21; positive
high arousal lists: M=0.21; positive low arousal lists: M=0.20;
neutral lists: M=0.21). A one-way independent samples ANOVA
(using post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons [p < .05]) showed that the
lists did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly on backward associative strength, F(4,
55)= 0.20, p= .94.
In addition, valence and arousal scores of lists as well as critical
lures were matched according to their List Emotion condition. Analyses
conﬁrmed that high arousal lists and critical lures (positive and
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negative) diﬀered in arousal from the valenced low arousal and the
neutral lists and critical lures, F(4, 55)= 52.35, p < .001, F(4,
55)= 52.76, p < .001, with no diﬀerence in arousal between valenced
low arousal and neutral lists and critical lures. Valence was signiﬁcantly
lower for the negative lists and critical lures (high and low in arousal)
compared to the positive and the neutral lists and critical lures and the
positive lists and critical lures were higher in valence compared to the
neutral lists and critical lures, F(4, 55)= 220.22, p < .001, F(4,
55)= 243.70, p < .001. Valence was signiﬁcantly higher in the posi-
tive high arousal compared to the positive low arousal lists and critical
lures (lists: M=7.35 vs. 6.32, p < .001; critical lures: M=7.93 vs.
7.06, p= .002). However, both positive valenced lists were sig-
niﬁcantly higher in valence than neutral (and negative) list types. The
means for all negative, positive, and neutral study items and critical
lures are shown in Table 1. Last, as interitem connectivity (how related
items are to each other) has been shown to aﬀect the production of false
memories in the DRM paradigm (McEvoy, Nelson, & Komatsu, 1999),
interitem connectivity between the ﬁve diﬀerent List Emotion types was
analysed using connectivity matrices (where values were available; see
McEvoy et al., 1999). There were no diﬀerences in connectivity, and
although it was lower for negative lists low in arousal (see Table 1), this
was not signiﬁcant, F(4, 55)= 1.00, p= .42.
The ﬁrst 10 words per list were shown individually in descending
strength of association to the non-presented critical lure on a computer
screen (centrally in black, 80-point Arial Rounded MT font, white
background). However, words in half of the 12 lists of each List
Emotion condition were presented at a speed of two seconds (2000-ms)
where the other half were presented at a speed of 20ms (20-ms) per
word. To accomplish this, the 12 lists of each List Emotion condition
were divided into two sets of six lists, labelled List Set A and List Set B.
For both sets, the average backward associative strength, valence, and
arousal values between the List Emotion conditions were equated (the
backward associative strength for each list as well as valence and
arousal scores for lists and critical lures separated by List Set A and B
can be found in Appendix A). The lists were shown blocked by List
Emotion and Presentation Speed (i.e., List Set A and B) in superordinate
blocks that not only included the presentation of a particular List
Emotion type (e.g., exposure to the positive high arousal lists at 2000-
ms and at 20-ms) but also the recognition test for the words presented
in that block (e.g., for positive high arousal words presented at 2000-ms
and at 20-ms). Whereas the order of the ﬁve List Emotion blocks, as
well as the order of the lists within their Presentation Speed condition,
was randomized, the order of the two Presentation Speed conditions
(i.e., List Set A and B) was kept constant for a participant throughout
the study. More speciﬁcally, half of the participants viewed the lists at
2000-ms ﬁrst followed by the lists at 20-ms and the other half of the
participants viewed the lists at 20-ms ﬁrst followed by the lists at 2000-
ms. Further, the use of List Set A and List Set B was counterbalanced
between the 20ms and 2000-ms conditions to reduce the risk of list
eﬀects.
Recognition test. Participants completed ﬁve diﬀerent recognition tests
(one in each List Emotion block), each consisting of 72 items. More
speciﬁcally, each test consisted of: 12 critical lures, 36 list items [3
items from each of the 12 presented lists (1 item randomly chosen from
positions 1–3, 1 item from positions 4–6, and 1 item from positions
7–10)], 12 non-presented but weakly related ﬁller items (1 low
associate for each of the 12 critical lures) and 12 non-presented and
unrelated ﬁller items. The non-presented but semantically related items
were randomly chosen from the last two items of a list that were not
presented at encoding. The unrelated ﬁller items were matched for
valence and arousal depending on the List Emotion condition. All test
items (both those encoded at 2000-ms and at 20-ms) appeared on the
computer screen one at a time and were presented in random order. E-
Prime was used for presentation and data collection.
Procedure
Participants were exposed to the ﬁve diﬀerent List Emotion blocks
(ﬁve separate study and test phases) in one session lasting approxi-
mately 90min. The blocks were separated by a 1-minute forced break
to prevent fatigue. Within each of the blocks, the presentation of the
lists was preceded by on-screen instructions announcing the
Presentation Speed condition (e.g. “Lists 1–6 will be presented slowly”,
lasting 5 s) followed by an announcement of each individual list (List 1,
List 2, List 3, etc., lasting 2 s). Then the 10 associates appeared in-
dividually on the screen, followed by an “End of list” slide (lasting 2 s in
the 2000-ms condition and 5 s in the 20-ms condition). Half of the lists
in each block were shown at 2000-ms, with each word separated by a
1 s interval, and the other half was shown at 20-ms, with each word
separated by a 100ms interval.
After the presentation of all 12 lists of a block, a 5-minute distractor
task (a Sudoku or Maze puzzle) preceded the self-paced recognition test
of that block. By pressing labelled keys on their keyboard, participants
were instructed to press old if a word was presented on one of the lists
that they had studied in that block or to press new if it had not. For old
responses participants were ask to press remember only if they were able
to consciously recollect vivid contextual details of the word’s study
presentation (i.e. recollecting some detail or context, such as an image
or thought), to press know if the word felt familiar but if they could not
remember it (i.e. if they had the sensation that the word was presented
but if they could not remember any speciﬁc details) and to press guess
when they were not sure whether or not the word was presented in that
block but if they could not deﬁnitely reject it. In each block these in-
structions were repeated on-screen and they were provided verbally by
the researcher preceding the memory test in Block 1.
Results and discussion
To analyze participants’ recognition responses (old judgments to list
items, critical lures and related ﬁller items) separate 2 (Presentation
Speed: 2000-ms [slow] vs. 20-ms [speeded])× 5 (List Emotion:
Table 1
Overall mean values and 95% Conﬁdence Intervals for list emotion conditions as a function of list variables.
Valence Arousal BAS Connectivity
List items Critical lures List items Critical lures List items List items
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
M LB UB M LB UB M LB UB M LB UB M LB UB M LB UB
Negative/high 3.08 2.77 3.40 2.74 2.33 3.14 5.95 5.69 6.21 6.89 6.58 7.19 0.19 0.14 0.24 0.48 0.17 0.79
Negative/low 3.44 3.08 3.80 2.71 2.26 3.16 4.48 4.26 4.70 4.36 3.84 4.87 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.02 0.46
Positive/high 7.35 7.07 7.62 7.93 7.63 8.23 5.92 5.63 6.20 6.33 5.90 6.76 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.52 0.25 0.79
Positive/low 6.32 6.11 6.53 7.06 6.80 7.32 4.29 4.05 4.53 4.10 3.66 4.55 0.21 0.14 0.28 0.44 0.26 0.62
Neutral 5.18 5.04 5.32 5.34 5.12 5.56 4.38 4.09 4.67 3.81 3.39 4.23 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.35 0.11 0.60
Note: M, LB, and UB refers to Mean, Lower Bound, and Upper Bound for 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) respectively. BAS refers to Backward Associative Strength.
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negative/high vs. negative/low vs. positive/high vs. positive/low vs.
neutral) repeated measure ANOVAs were used. Because responses to
the unrelated ﬁller items were not manipulated by Presentation Speed,
old judgements to these items were analyzed by List Emotion only using
one-way repeated measure ANOVAs. The analysis of remember, know,
and guess responses did not reveal a pattern of signiﬁcance that de-
viated from the ﬁndings in the old responses, however they are reported
in a footnote for completeness.1 To correct for participant’s response
bias, next to the analysis of participants’ recognition scores, correct old
responses to list items and false old responses to the critical lure words
were further analyzed using Signal Detection Analysis. For this, signal
detection parameters ď (discrimination ability) and C (response bias)
were computed using the emotion speciﬁc list items/critical lures and
the emotion corresponding unrelated ﬁller items (Snodgrass and
Corwin (1988) correction). A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used
where necessary. Signiﬁcant interactions were explored using simple
main eﬀects and Bonferroni pairwise-comparisons (alpha set at 0.05).
Mean proportions and 95% conﬁdence intervals for old responses are
presented in Table 2.
Correct recognition of list items
For participants’ correct old responses to list items, analysis yielded
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1, 49)= 205.29,
MSE=0.031, p < .001, ηp2=0.81, with more old responses in the
slow (M=0.70, 95% CI [0.65, 0.74]) compared to the speeded word
presentation condition (M=0.47, 95% CI [0.42, 0.52]). In addition,
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1 Recollective judgements made for list items and critical lures for Experiment
1 are reported in Table 4. For participants’ correct remember responses to list
items, analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1,
49)= 191.34, p < .001, ηp2=0.80, with more remember responses in the slow
(M=0.45, 95% CI [0.40, 0.51]) compared to the speedy word presentation
condition (M=0.19, 95% CI [0.15, 0.23]). The main eﬀect of List Emotion was
not signiﬁcant, F(4, 196)= 2.29, p= .061, ηp2=0.50, but there was a sig-
niﬁcant Presentation Speed× List Emotion interaction, F(4, 196)=2.80,
p= .027, ηp2=0.05. Analysis of the simple main eﬀects using one-way AN-
OVAs showed that the main eﬀect of List Emotion was signiﬁcant in the
speeded, F(3.36, 164.49)= 4.09, p= .006, ηp2=0.08, but not in the slow word
presentation condition, F(4, 196)= 1.74, p= .143, ηp2=0.03. Bonferroni
pairwise comparisons in the speeded condition showed that there were more
remember responses in the negative/high condition (M=0.24, 95% CI [0.18,
0.31]) compared to the positive/low (M=0.16, 95% CI [0.12, 0.20], p= .015)
and the neutral condition (M=0.18, 95% CI [0.14, 0.22], p=0.023), with no
further diﬀerences (all ps > .07). Analysis of simple main eﬀects using paired
sample t-tests supported the main eﬀect of Presentation Speed. (all List com-
parisons ps < .001). For know judgements, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of List Emotion, F(4, 196)= 2.47, p= .046, ηp2=0.50. However, Bonferroni
pairwise comparisons did not yield signiﬁcant diﬀerences between any of the
List Emotion conditions (all ps > .22). There was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
Presentation Speed (F < 1) and no interaction, F(3.31, 162.32)= 2.07,
p= .10, ηp2=0.04. Last, for guess responses, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of Presentation Speed, F(1, 49)= 11.02, p= .002, ηp2=0.18, with more guess
responses in the speeded (M=0.11, 95% CI [0.09, 0.14]) compared to the slow
word presentation condition (M=0.09, 95% CI [0.07, 0.11]). There was no
main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 196)= 2.00, p= .10, ηp2=0.04, and no
signiﬁcant Presentation Speed× List Emotion interaction, F(4, 196)=1.11,
p= .358, ηp2=0.02.For participants’ false remember responses to the critical
lures, analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1,
49)= 12.42, p= .001, ηp2=0.20, showing that there were more remember
judgements in the slow (M=0.27, 95% CI [0.21, 0.32]) compared to the
speeded word presentation condition (M=0.20, 95% CI [0.15, 0.25]). In ad-
dition, there was a main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 196)=5.18, p= .001,
ηp
2=0.10, with more remember responses in the negative/high condition
(M=0.30, 95% CI [0.24, 0.37]) compared to all other lists (ps > .05). The
interaction between Presentation Speed and List Emotion was not signiﬁcant
(F < 1). Last, for know as well as guess judgments, no signiﬁcant main eﬀects or
interactions were found (main eﬀect of List Emotion for know responses: F(4,
196)=1.67, p= .16, ηp2=0.03, all other Fs < 1).
M.V. Hellenthal, et al. Journal of Memory and Language 107 (2019) 54–68
58
there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 196)= 5.66,
MSE=0.024, p < .001, ηp2=0.10, showing more old responses in the
negative/high condition (M=0.63, 95% CI [0.58, 0.69]) compared to
the positive/low (M=0.56, 95% CI [0.50, 0.61], p= .019) and the
neutral condition (M=0.54, 95% CI [0.49, 0.59], p < .001), with no
further diﬀerences between the other List Emotion conditions (all
ps > .10). There was no interaction, F(4, 196)= 1.90, MSE=0.018,
p= .112, ηp2=0.04 (see Fig. 1).
False recognition of critical lures
For false old responses to the critical lure words, there was a sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1, 49)= 25.64,
MSE=0.038, p < .001, ηp2=0.34, with more false old responses in
the slow (M=0.62, 95% CI [0.57, 0.68]) compared to the speeded
word presentation condition (M=0.53, 95% CI [0.48, 0.59]). In ad-
dition, there was a main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 196)= 9.17,
MSE=0.044, p < .001, ηp2=0.16, and a signiﬁcant Presentation
Speed× List Emotion interaction, F(4, 196)= 2.44, MSE=0.037,
p= .048, ηp2=0.05. Analysis of SMEs using one-way ANOVAs showed
that the main eﬀect of List Emotion was signiﬁcant in the speeded, F(4,
196)= 9.63, MSE=0.045, p < .001, ηp2=0.16, but not in the slow
word presentation condition, F(4, 196)= 1.63,MSE=0.036, p= .169,
ηp
2=0.03. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons in the speeded condition
revealed more false old responses in the negative/high condition
(M=0.68, 95% CI [0.61, 0.76]) compared to any of the other List
Emotion conditions (positive/high: M=0.49, 95% CI [0.41, 0.57],
p < .001; positive/low: M=0.53, 95% CI [0.44, 0.61], p= .015; ne-
gative/low: M=0.54, 95% CI [0.47, 0.61], p= .006; neutral:
M=0.43, 95% CI [0.35, 0.51], p < .001; see Fig. 2). There were no
further diﬀerences between the other List Emotion conditions (all
ps > .14). Alternatively, simple main eﬀects analysis using paired
sample t-tests showed a signiﬁcant reduction in false recognition be-
tween the slow compared to the speeded word presentation condition in
the positive/high condition, t(49)= 3.04, p= .004, d=0.43, the po-
sitive/low condition, t(49)= 2.63, p= .011, d=0.37, the negative/
low condition, t(49)= 2.37, p= .022, d=0.34, as well as in the neu-
tral condition, t(49)= 3.75, p < .001, d=0.53. However, there was
no diﬀerence in the negative/high condition, t(49)=−0.32, p= .754,
d=−0.04.
False recognition of related and unrelated ﬁller items
For false old responses to the related ﬁller items, there was no main
eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1, 49)= 1.51, MSE=0.028, p= .23,
ηp
2=0.03. However, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of List
Emotion, F(4, 196)= 3.85, MSE=0.037, p= .005, ηp2=0.07.
Pairwise comparisons showed that participants made more false old
judgements in the neutral condition (M=0.38, 95% CI [0.32, 0.45])
compared to the positive/high (M=0.30, 95% CI [0.24, 0.36],
p= .027) and the positive/low condition (M=0.29, 95% CI [0.23,
0.36], p= .007), with no further diﬀerences (all ps > .15). There was
no Presentation Speed× List Emotion interaction (F < 1).
For false old responses to the unrelated ﬁller items (see Table 3), a
one-way repeated ANOVA (see explanation for this analysis at the be-
ginning of the results section) revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of List
Emotion, F(4, 196)= 5.06, MSE=0.015, p= .001, ηp2=0.09. Pair-
wise comparisons showed that there were more false old responses in
the neutral condition (M=0.25, 95% CI [0.20, 0.30]) compared to the
positive/high (M=0.17, 95% CI [0.12, 0.21], p= .007), the positive/
low (M=0.17, 95% CI [0.12, 0.22], p= .006) as well as the negative/
high condition (M=0.15, 95% CI [0.11, 0.20], p= .003).
Signal detection analysis for list items
Signal detection parameters d’ and C were analysed separately using
the same repeated measure ANOVAs as above. The analysis of d’ allows
use to examine the discriminability of the participant. Larger values
equal better memory performance. Criterion value C allows us to se-
parately distinguish the decision criterion used by the participant.
Values of 0 represent no decision bias. The higher the value above 0, the
more conservative the bias (criterion favors no responses). The lower
the value, the more liberal the bias towards a ‘yes’ response. The results
of d’ and C are summarized in Table 3. For discrimination ability d’ of
participants’ correct old responses to the list items, there was a sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1, 49)= 210.73,
MSE=0.261, p < .001, ηp2=0.81, with better discrimination ability
in the slow (M= 1.51, 95% CI [1.37, 1.66]) compared to the speeded
word presentation condition (M=0.85, 95% CI [0.74, 0.97]). In ad-
dition, there was a main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 196)= 9.64,
MSE=0.582, p < .001, ηp2=0.16, with better discrimination ability
in all four emotional list conditions (positive/high: [M= 1.27, 95% CI
(1.07, 1.47)]; positive/low: [M= 1.18, 95% CI (0.99, 1.36)]; negative/
high: [M= 1.45, 95% CI (1.25, 1.64)]; negative/low: [M= 1.22, 95%
CI (1.05, 1.40) compared to the neutral condition (M=0.80, 95% CI
[0.63, 0.97], p= .001, p= .010, p < .001, and p= .003), with no
further diﬀerences between the List Emotion conditions (all ps > .15).
There was no signiﬁcant Presentation Speed× List Emotion interaction
F(4, 196)= 1.59, MSE=0.165, p= .179, ηp2=0.03.
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Fig. 1. Mean proportions of old responses for the correct recognition of list items as a function of List Emotion and Presentation Speed (Error bars represent standard
error) for Experiment 1.
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For response bias C, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
Presentation Speed, F(1, 49)= 210.73, MSE=0.065, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.81, showing a relatively liberal bias in the slow (M=0.19, 95%
CI [0.08, 0.30]) compared to the speeded condition (M=0.52, 95% CI
[0.40, 0.64]). There was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4,
196)= 1.61, MSE=0.142, p= .173, ηp2=0.03, and no signiﬁcant
Presentation Speed× List Emotion interaction, F(4, 196)= 1.59,
MSE=0.041, p= .179, ηp2=0.03.
Signal detection analysis for critical lures
For discrimination ability d’ of participants’ false old responses to
the lures, analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation
Speed, F(1, 49)= 25.68, MSE=0.268, p < .001, ηp2=0.34, showing
better discrimination ability in the slow (M= 1.27, 95% CI [1.11,
1.43]) compared to the speeded condition (M= 1.03, 95% CI [0.88,
1.19]). In addition, there was a main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4,
196)= 11.13, MSE=0.741, p < .001, ηp2=0.19, and, similar to the
main analysis above, a signiﬁcant Presentation Speed× List Emotion
interaction, F(4, 196)= 2.58, MSE=0.261, p= .038, ηp2=0.50.
Analysis of simple main eﬀects using one-way ANOVAs showed that the
main eﬀect of List Emotion was signiﬁcant in both, the slow, F(4,
196)= 4.72,MSE=0.494, p= .001, ηp2=0.09, as well as the speeded
word presentation condition, F(4, 196)= 12.99, MSE=0.507,
p < .001, ηp2=0.21. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons in the slow
condition revealed better discrimination ability in the negative/high
(M= 1.51, 95% CI [1.28, 1.73]) and the positive/low condition
(M= 1.35, 95% CI [1.11, 1.59]) compared to the neutral condition
(M=0.92, 95% CI [0.67, 1.17], p= .003 and p= .044), with no fur-
ther diﬀerences (all ps > .08). In the speeded condition, analysis re-
vealed better discrimination ability in the negative/high condition
(M= 1.55, 95% CI [1.30, 1.80]) compared to all other List Emotion
conditions (positive/high: M=0.98, 95% CI [0.73, 1.22], p= .003;
positive/low: M=1.06, 95% CI [0.82, 1.31], p= .028; negative/low:
M=1.06, 95% CI [0.82, 1.29], p= .017; neutral: M=0.53, 95% CI
[0.31, 0.74], p < .001). In addition, discrimination ability was better
for all other emotional conditions compared to the neutral condition
(positive/high: p= .015, positive/low: p= .001, negative/low:
p= .007), with no further diﬀerences (all ps > .90). Alternatively,
simple main eﬀects analysis using paired sample t-tests showed better
discrimination ability in the slow compared to the speeded condition in
the positive/high condition, t(49)= 2.95, p= .005, d=0.42, the po-
sitive/low condition, t(49)= 2.77, p= .008, d=0.39, the negative/
low condition, t(49)= 2.48, p= .017, d=0.35, as well as in the neu-
tral condition, t(49)= 3.77, p < .001, d=0.53. However, there was
no diﬀerence in discrimination ability in the negative/high condition, t
(49)=−0.42, p= .679, d=−0.06.
For response bias C, analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
Presentation Speed, F(1, 49)= 25.68, MSE=0.067, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.34, showing a relatively liberal bias in the slow (M=0.31, 95%
CI [0.20, 0.42]) compared to the speeded condition (M=0.43, 95% CI
[0.31, 0.55]). Whereas the main eﬀect of List Emotion was not sig-
niﬁcant, F(4, 196)= 2.26, MSE=0.156, p= .064, ηp2=0.044, the
Presentation Speed× List emotion interaction was, F(4, 196)= 2.58,
MSE=0.065, p= .038, ηp2=0.05. Analysis of simple main eﬀects
using one-way ANOVAs showed that the main eﬀect of List Emotion
was signiﬁcant in the speeded, F(4, 196)= 2.85, MSE=0.129,
p= .025, ηp2=0.06, but not in the slow word presentation condition, F
(4, 196)= 1.65, MSE=0.092, p= .16, ηp2=0.03. However, further
comparisons in the speeded condition only revealed a relatively liberal
bias in the negative/high (M=0.29, 95% CI [0.14, 0.44]) compared to
the positive/high condition (M=0.52, 95% CI [0.38, 0.66], p= .037),
with no other diﬀerences (all ps > .16). Alternatively, simple main
eﬀects analysis using paired sample t-tests showed a more liberal bias in
the slow compared to the speeded condition in the positive/high con-
dition, t(49)=−2.95, p= .005, d=−0.42, the positive/low condi-
tion, t(49)=−2.77, p= .008, d=−0.39, the negative/low condition,
t(49)=−2.48, p= .017, d=−0.35, as well as in the neutral condi-
tion, t(49)=−3.77, p < .001, d=−0.53. However, there was no
diﬀerence in response bias in the negative/high condition, t(49)= .42,
p= .679, d=0.06.
The aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate and extend the ﬁndings of
Knott et al. (2018) who found higher false memory rates for high
arousing negative compared to positive and neutral critical lures when
attentional resources were reduced at DRM encoding. We aimed to
extend these ﬁndings by adding non-arousing valenced stimuli to ex-
amine whether emotion enhanced memories that depended on arousal
and valence are associated with automatic or controlled processing. As
outlined in the introduction and shown in previous emotion enhanced
memory research (e.g., Clark-Foos & Marsh, 2008; Kang et al., 2014),
we predicted that non-arousing valenced, neutral, as well as positive
high arousing false memory production should be mediated by atten-
tion and hence reﬂect controlled cognitive processing. However, ne-
gative arousing false memories should persist because, consistent with
neurocognitive ﬁndings, such stimuli may beneﬁt from more automatic
processing and can rely on relatively automatic capture of attention at
encoding.
Analyses showed that speeded word presentation reduced old re-
sponses to the critical lures for the positive (high and low arousal),
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Fig. 2. Mean proportions of old responses for the false recognition of critical lures as a function of List Emotion and Presentation Speed (Error bars represent standard
error) for Experiment 1.
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negative low arousal and neutral lists. In contrast, false alarms for the
negative high arousal critical lures did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer across
speed presentation conditions. Further, analysis showed that under
reduced attention conditions, the amount of false alarms for the high
arousal negative critical lures exceeded the false alarms for any other
list type. Signal detection analysis in the speeded condition conﬁrmed
these ﬁndings and showed that discrimination ability (more false
memories to critical lures and fewer false alarms to unrelated ﬁllers)
was higher for high arousal negative lures compared to any of the other
valenced and neutral critical lures. Thus, it appears that the speeded
presentation condition had less inﬂuence on the recognition of negative
arousing stimuli. In line with the ﬁndings of Knott et al. (2018) our
analyses indicated that participants were still able to produce false
memories for negative high arousal stimuli that appear to require less
controlled attentional resources. This ﬁnding is consistent with past
neurocognitive and behavioral research that has demonstrated that
negative arousing items can be encoded using automatic processing and
thus associates in the network can still be activated under reduced at-
tentional resources. Extending their ﬁndings, the encoding of positive
(arousing/non-arousing) and non-arousing negative stimuli require
more elaborate and controlled processing, thus reduced attention hin-
dered successful encoding and reduced the activation of nodes within
the positive, negative non-arousing and neutral associative networks.
It should be noted that the emotion enhanced false memory eﬀect
was not present, or not as pronounced, in the slow word presentation
condition. Although the pattern of the means reﬂected a trend com-
parable to that in the speeded condition (see Fig. 2), only signal de-
tection analysis in the slow condition provided some evidence for
higher discriminability of negative high arousal critical lures compared
to the neutral critical lures. However, these ﬁndings are in line Knott
et al. (2018) as well as with other studies who observed more striking
inﬂuence of emotion on memory performance under divided attention
compared to full attention conditions (e.g., Talmi, Schimmack et al.,
2007). If emotionally arousing stimuli automatically capture more at-
tention than neutral stimuli, and if emotional enhanced memory is
mediated by attention, emotion-enhanced false memories would be
more pronounced after reduced attention at encoding (see also, Sava,
Paquet, Dumurgier, Hugon, & Chainay, 2016).
We hypothesized from the outset that if attention was treated as a
repeated measures factor we would expect a reduction in false mem-
ories for lists that were encoded under reduced attention conditions. We
have seen that this is true for all but negative arousing lists and we have
argued that this is a result of distinct neural processes involved in the
encoding of negative-arousing stimuli. Interestingly, for these lists, we
also found no change in response bias between fast and slow pre-
sentation speeds. The strength of the critical lure and the decision set to
make a response was the same in both conditions because the critical
lure was similarly activated in both conditions. Thus, discrimination
and measured bias did not diﬀer. However, for all other emotion con-
ditions, discrimination between target and distractor was better, and
measured bias (Criterion Bias) was more liberal for items encoded with
a slow presentation speed. With such an explicit impact on the required
controlled attentional processes to encode list items, participants ap-
peared to be more conservative in their decision strategy for items that
were encoded in the speeded condition. We return to this point in the
General Discussion.
Last, with regard to participants correct old responses, although
there was a memory advantage for negative high arousal over neutral
and positive low arousal list items there were no further diﬀerences no
interaction between List Emotion and Presentation Speed. Signal de-
tection analysis provided some evidence for the presence of an emotion
enhanced memory eﬀect with better discrimination ability in all four
emotional list conditions compared to the neutral condition. We return
to the ﬁndings for correct recognition in the General Discussion.
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Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the ﬁrst experiment but
test presentation speed as a between-participants factor. The rationale
for the second experiment is a methodological one and comes from
contradictory ﬁndings in the DRM literature regarding the eﬀects of
divided/reduced attention on false memory production. If, as we hy-
pothesize, decision strategies will be more liberal when all words are
encoded with limited attention, then we would expect more false
memories in the reduced compared to full attention condition when
attention is manipulated between-participants. That is, if participants
have only been presented with items in a limited attention condition,
they are likely to set a lower threshold for accepting an item as old
because they know words would be less familiar to them. In order to
increase the probability of accurately recognizing a word, they are
likely to adopt a more liberal criterion. We expect this to be the case for
all list types, however, given that negative arousing stimuli appear to be
processed with less attentional resources, critical lures associated with
negative arousing lists should still produce better discrimination (dis-
tinguish critical lures from new items), and greater false memories rates
than all other list types.
Method
Participants
Ninety-seven participants from City University (27% male) aged
18–58 (M=23.91, SD= 8.66) individually took part in this study for
course credit or remuneration. All participants were ﬂuent-English-
proﬁcient (75% were English native speakers). Written informed con-
sent was obtained from each participant. A priori power analysis with a
medium eﬀect size (0.25) and Power of 0.8 resulted in a sample size of
78.
Design and stimuli
Experiment 2 used a 2(Presentation Speed: 2000-ms vs. 20-
ms)× 5(List Emotion: negative/high vs. negative/low vs. positive/high
vs. positive/low vs. neutral) mixed factor design with Presentation
Speed as the between-participants factor. Participants were randomly
allocated to either the 2000-ms (N=49) or the 20-ms (N=48)
Presentation Speed condition. The same 60 DRM lists as those in
Experiment 1 were used. Again, participants completed ﬁve List
Emotion blocks (study and test phases). For list counterbalancing pur-
poses, in both Presentation Speed conditions, half of the participants
were exposed to List Set A while the other half of the participants were
exposed to List Set B.
All other study and test conditions were the same as in the ﬁrst
experiment with the following exceptions. A 48 item recognition test
was used with 6 critical lures, 24 list items, 6 non-presented but weakly
related ﬁller items and 12 non-presented and unrelated ﬁller items. The
study was completed in one session lasting approximately 75min in the
2000ms condition and 65min in the 20ms condition (although the
interval between the study-test phases remained identical, the faster
completion rate was due to the presentation rate of the stimuli).
Results and discussion
To analyze participants’ recognition responses (old, judgments to list
items, critical lures, related and unrelated ﬁller items) separate 2
(Presentation Speed: 2000-ms [slow] vs. 20-ms [speeded])× 5 (List
Emotion: negative/high vs. negative/low vs. positive/high vs. positive/
low vs. neutral) mixed factor ANOVAs were conducted with repeated
measures on the last factor (note that in Experiment 2, the unrelated
ﬁller items were analyzed in the same way as the other items types
because, in contrast to Experiment 1, here they were manipulated by
presentation speed). Again, Similar to Experiment 1, the analysis of
remember, know, and guess responses did not reveal a pattern of
signiﬁcance that deviated from the ﬁndings in the old responses,
however they are reported in a footnote for completeness.2 To examine
participant’s response bias, as in Experiment 1, correct old responses to
the list items and false old responses to the critical lure words were
further analyzed using Signal Detection Analysis. For this, signal de-
tection parameters ď (discrimination ability) and C (response bias)
were computed using the emotion speciﬁc list items/critical lures and
the emotion and presentation speed corresponding unrelated ﬁller
items (Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) correction). Where Mauchly's Test
of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been
violated (p < .05), a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. Also,
signiﬁcant interactions were explored using Bonferroni pairwise-com-
parisons (alpha set at .05). Mean proportions and 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals for old responses are reported in Table 2.
Correct recognition of list items
For participants’ correct old responses to list items, analysis yielded
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 380)= 3.51,
MSE=0.014, p= .008, ηp2=0.04, with more old responses in the
negative/high (M=0.73, 95% CI [0.69, 0.76]), the positive/high
(M=0.73, 95% CI [0.69, 0.76]) and the negative/low condition
(M=0.72, 95% CI [0.68, 0.75]) compared to the neutral condition
(M=0.67, 95% CI [0.64, 0.71], p= .006, p= .029 and p= .045).
There were no further diﬀerences (all ps > .75). There was a main
eﬀect of Presentation Speed as well, F(1, 95)= 23.10, MSE=0.105,
p < .001, ηp2=0.20, with more old responses in the slow (M=0.78,
95% CI [0.74, 0.82]) compared to the speeded word presentation
condition (M=0.64, 95% CI [0.60, 0.68]). There was no
Emotion× Presentation Speed interaction (F < 1; see Fig. 3).
False recognition of critical lures
For false old responses to the critical lures, there was a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 380)= 6.31, MSE=0.038, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.06, showing more false old responses in the negative/high
condition (M=0.76, 95% CI [0.71, 0.80]) compared to the positive/
low (M=0.62, 95% CI [0.57, 0.68], p < .001), the negative/low
(M=0.66, 95% CI [0.61, 0.72], p= .010) and the neutral condition
(M=0.66, 95% CI [0.61, 0.72], p= .017), with no further diﬀerences
(all ps > .28). Analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation
2 Participants remember, know, and guess responses to list items and critical lures
in Experiment 2 are reported in Table 4. Analysis of participants’ correct re-
member responses to list items revealed no main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4,
380)= 1.37, p= .24, ηp2=0.01, and no signiﬁcant List Emotion× Presenta-
tion Speed interaction (F < 1). However, there was a main eﬀect of Pre-
sentation Speed, F(1, 95)= 49.90, p < .001, ηp2=0.34, with more remember
responses in the slow (M=0.53, 95% CI [0.48, 0.58]) compared to the speeded
condition (M=0 .28, 95% CI [0.22, 0.33]). For know judgements, there was no
main eﬀect of List Emotion, F[3.60, 341.92]=1.64, p= .17, ηp2=0.02, and
no List Emotion×Presentation Speed interaction either (F < 1). However,
there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Presentation Speed as well, F(1,
95)= 4.49, p= .037, ηp2=0.05, with more know responses in the speeded
(M=0 .19, 95% CI [0.17, 0.22]) relative to the slow condition (M=0 .16, 95%
CI [0.13, 0.18]). Last, the eﬀect of Presentation Speed was found for guess
judgements as well, F(1, 95)= 14.18, p < .001, ηp2=0.13, with more guess
responses in the speeded (M=0 .17, 95% CI [0.14, 0.20]) compared to the slow
condition (M=0 .10, 95% CI [0.07, 0.12]; all other Fs < 1).For participants’
false remember responses to the critical lures, analysis revealed no main eﬀect of
List Emotion, F(4, 380)=2.14, p= .075, ηp2=0.02, and no signiﬁcant List
Emotion× Presentation Speed interaction (F < 1). However, there was a trend
for the main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1, 95)= 3.68, p= .058, ηp2=0.04,
with more remember responses in the speeded (M=0 .34, 95% CI [0.28, 0.40])
compared to the slow condition (M=0 .26, 95% CI [0.20, 0.32]). For partici-
pants’ know and guess responses no signiﬁcant main eﬀects or interactions were
found (know responses: List Emotion [F(4, 380)=1.46, p= .215, ηp2=0.02],
Presentation Speed: [F(1, 95)= 1.27, p= .262, ηp2=0.01; guess responses: List
Emotion [F(4, 380)=1.01, p= .376, ηp2=0.01]; all other Fs < 1).
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Speed as well, F(1, 95)= 9.25, MSE=0.190, p= .003, ηp2=0.90.
However, contrary to the pattern found in Experiment 1, there were
more false old responses in the speeded (M=0.74, 95% CI [0.68,
0.79]) relative to the slow word presentation condition (M=0.62, 95%
CI [0.56, 0.67]; see Fig. 4). There was no List Emotion×Presentation
Speed interaction (F < 1).
False recognition of related and unrelated ﬁller items
For false old responses to the related ﬁller items, analysis revealed a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(3.63, 344.60)= 7.31,
MSE=0.040, p < .001, ηp2=0.07, showing that participants made
more false old judgements in the neutral (M=0.45, 95% CI [0.40,
0.51]) compared to any other of the other List Emotion conditions
(positive/high: M=0.37, 95% CI [0.33, 0.42], p= .008, positive/low:
M=0.35, 95% CI [0.30, 0.40], p= .005, negative/high: M=0.36,
95% CI [0.31, 0.41], p= .021 and negative/low: M=0.45, 95% CI
[0.40, 0.51], p < .001). There were no further diﬀerences (all ps >
.08). There was also a main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1,
95)= 13.38, MSE=0.161, p < .001, ηp2=0.12, with more false old
responses in the speeded (M=0.44, 95% CI [0.39, 0.49])
For false old responses to the unrelated ﬁller items, analysis re-
vealed no main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1, 95)= 1.19,
MSE=0.094, p= .277, ηp2=0.01. However, there was a signiﬁcant a
main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 380)= 6.63, MSE=0.013, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.07, as well as a signiﬁcant List Emotion× Presentation Speed
interaction, F(4, 380)= 2.74, p= .029, ηp2=0.03. Analysis of simple
main eﬀects using one-way ANOVAs showed that the diﬀerences in List
Emotion type were more pronounced in the speeded, F(4, 188)= 7.14,
MSE=0.012, p < .001, ηp2=0.13, compared to the slow condition, F
(4, 192)= 2.33, MSE=0.013, p= .058, ηp2=0.05. Whereas pairwise
comparisons did not reveal any diﬀerences in the slow condition (all
ps > .09), in the speeded condition, fewer old responses were found in
the positive/high condition (M=0.11, 95% CI [0.07, 0.15]) compared
to the positive/low (M=0.20, 95% CI [0.15, 0.25], p < .001), the
negative/low (M=0.19, 95% CI [0.15, 0.24], p= .004) as well as the
neutral condition (M=0.22, 95% CI [0.17, 0.27], p < .001, with no
further diﬀerences (all ps > .18).
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Fig. 3. Mean proportions of old responses for the correct recognition of list items as a function of List Emotion and Presentation Speed (Error bars represent standard
error) for Experiment 2.
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Fig. 4. Mean proportions of old responses for the false recognition of critical lures as a function of List Emotion and Presentation Speed (Error bars represent standard
error) for Experiment 2.
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Signal detection analysis for list items
The results of d′ and C are summarized in Table 3. For discrimina-
tion ability d′, the same analysis as above revealed a main eﬀect of
Presentation Speed, F(1, 95)= 24.51, MSE=1.95, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.21 with better discrimination ability in the slow (M= 1.97,
95% CI [1.79, 2.14]) compared to the speeded word presentation
condition (M= 1.34, 95% CI [1.16, 1.52]). Further, there was a main
eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4, 380)= 8.99, MSE=0.336, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.09, as well as a signiﬁcant List Emotion×Presentation Speed
interaction, F(4, 380)= 2.64, p= .034, ηp2=0.03. Separate one-way
ANOVAs, revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of List Emotion in the slow
condition, F(4, 192)= 2.45, MSE=0.352, p= .048, ηp2=0.05,
showing better discrimination ability in the negative/high condition
(M= 2.11, 95% CI [1.89, 2.34]) compared to the neutral condition
(M= 1.75, 95% CI [1.47, 2.03], p= .013). In the speeded condition the
main eﬀect of List Emotion was signiﬁcant as well, F(4, 188)= 9.45,
MSE=0.320, p < .001, ηp2=0.17. Whereas discrimination ability
was better in the negative/high (M= 1.46, 95% CI [1.26, 1.67])
compared to the neutral condition here as well (M= 1.07, 95% CI
[0.87, 1.27], p= .018), discrimination was also better in the positive/
high condition (M= 1.71, 95% CI [1.48, 1.94]) compared to the po-
sitive/low (M= 1.20, 95% CI [1.00, 1.41], p < .001), the negative/
low (M= 1.25, 95% CI [1.06, 1.43], p= .007), as well as the neutral
condition (p < .001).
For response bias C, there was no main eﬀect of List Emotion, F(4,
380)= 1.63,MSE=0.068, p= .165, ηp2=0.02, and no signiﬁcant List
Emotion×Presentation Speed Interaction, F(4, 380)= 1.16, p= .329,
ηp
2=0.01. However there was a main eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1,
95)= 5.01, MSE=0.631, p= .028, ηp2=0.05, showing a relative
liberal response bias in the slow condition (M=0.13, 95% CI [0.03,
0.24]) compared to the speeded condition (M=0.30, 95% CI [0.19,
0.40]).
Signal detection analysis for critical lures
For discrimination ability d’, analysis yielded no main eﬀect of
Presentation Speed, F(1, 95)= 1.95, MSE=1.693, p= .17, ηp2=0.02,
and no List Emotion×Presentation Speed interaction, F(4,
380)= 1.30, p= .27, ηp2=0.01. However the main eﬀect of List
Emotion was signiﬁcant, F(4, 380)= 9.69, MSE=0.491, p < .001,
ηp
2=0.09, with better discrimination ability in the negative/high
(M= 1.81, 95% CI [1.65, 1.97]) compared to the positive/low
(M= 1.33, 95% CI [1.16, 1.50], p < .001), the negative/low
(M= 1.42, 95% CI [1.24, 1.59], p= .001) and the neutral condition
(M= 1.34, 95% CI [1.16, 1.52], p < .001). In addition, discrimination
was better in the positive/high condition (M= 1.69, 95% CI [1.51,
1.87]) compared to the positive/low (p= .012), the neutral (p= .009)
and in borderline signiﬁcant form the negative/low condition
(p= .063; all other ps > 1.00).
Last, for response bias C, analysis revealed a main eﬀect of List
Emotion, F(4, 380)= 3.15, MSE=0.108, p= .014, ηp2=0.03, how-
ever, pairwise comparisons did not reveal any diﬀerences between the
ﬁve List Emotion conditions (all ps > .12). In addition, there was main
eﬀect of Presentation Speed, F(1, 95)= 7.90, MSE=0.848, p= .006,
ηp
2=0.08, showing a relative liberal bias in the speeded (M=0.17,
95% CI [0.05, 0.28]) compared to the slow word presentation condition
(M=0.40, 95% CI [0.28, 0.52]. There was no interaction between the
variables, F(4, 380)= 1.38, p= .24, ηp2=0.01.
The aim of Experiment 2 was to examine emotion enhanced false
memories in a study design in which Presentation Speed was treated as
a between-participants factor. In contrast to Experiment 1, analyses
showed that the speeded presentation increased false recognition of the
critical lures, but notably decreased correct recognition of list items.
The analysis of signal detection parameters shed some light on this. For
discriminability measures, participants were better able to distinguish
between list items and distractors in the slow compared to fast pre-
sentation condition, but more likely to distinguish critical lures from
distractors in the fast compared to slow condition. This was also ac-
companied by a decision-making process that diﬀered for list items and
critical lures. For the response bias measure, participants were more
liberal in the speeded compared to slow presentation condition which
reﬂected the fact that more old responses were made for critical lures in
that condition. Participants were likely able to set a more conservative
decision strategy for critical lures in the slow presentation condition
because they could rely more successfully on source-monitoring stra-
tegies to accurately reject the critical lure items. Similar to Experiment
1, there was a more liberal bias measure for list items in the slow
compared to fast presentation condition.
There was also a main eﬀect of List Emotion for both critical lures
and lists items, with both showing higher recognition rates for negative
high arousing stimuli. We note that in this experiment, although there
was a trend in the right direction, negative and positive arousing lists
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in recognition across both speed conditions.
This supports an enhanced emotion eﬀect speciﬁc to arousing stimuli.
General discussion
The results from these two experiments address two aims of this
study. First and foremost, can we provide additional behavioral data to
support the neurocognitive ﬁnding that valence and arousal play dif-
ferent roles in encoding processes via distinct neural pathways, and
make the inference that this leads to diﬀerent rates of false memory
formation when those pathways require more controlled processing.
Second, does the manipulation of experimental design cause the con-
tradictory increase or decrease in false memories rates due to changes
in decision criteria? Regarding the former, from Experiment 1, negative
arousing stimuli were less aﬀected by the reduction in attentional re-
sources compared to other stimuli and could therefore rely more on
automatic, as opposed to controlled, processing. Indeed, all other va-
lenced and neutral lists were aﬀected by changes in attentional re-
sources and thus appeared to be dependent on controlled processing.
We argue that for these lists, the decrease in false recognition occurred
because the speeded presentation reduced participants’ ability to en-
code the list and subsequently generate associates to the words.
Regarding the latter aim, the changes in experimental design appeared
to have signiﬁcant subsequent impact on decision strategy with de-
creased false memory rates for repeated measures manipulation of at-
tention and increased false memory rates for a between-participants
manipulation of attention. These ﬁndings will be discussed in turn.
In Experiment 1, for all but negative high arousing lists, the overall
false old responses to the critical lure words were signiﬁcantly impaired
by a reduction in stimulus presentation speed, a result in line with our
predictions and prior research (e.g., Knott & Dewhurst, 2007; Knott
et al., 2018; Seamon et al., 1998). Explanations for these ﬁndings come
from theoretical models of false memory production, where stimuli
have to be encoded to allow for spreading activation (e.g., associative
activation theory, Howe et al., 2009; associative monitoring theory,
Roediger & McDermott, 1995) or the extraction of gist (fuzzy-trace
theory, Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008). The fast
presentation times at DRM encoding in Experiment 1 suﬃciently re-
duced stimulus processing, which in turn, hindered the generation of
associations. However, this was not the case for high arousing negative
associations, where false memories for critical lures persisted even with
fast presentation time. Although not directly testing such theory, our
results provide further support that emotion modulates (false) memory
through an automatic route primarily consisting of the amygdala and
brain regions related to memory, which are less dependent on atten-
tional resources (Clark-Foos & Marsh, 2008; Kang et al., 2014; Kern,
Libkuman, Otani, & Holmes, 2005; Talmi, Schimmack et al., 2007).
Under conditions of limited attentional resources, high arousing nega-
tive stimuli that are automatically processed should then allow for the
extraction of gist or the activation of associative connections when
encoding negative high arousing DRM lists (Knott et al., 2018).
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Regarding arousal, unlike negative information, memory for positive
high arousal stimuli was adversely aﬀected by the fast presentation
times. Hence, positive stimuli high in arousal seemed to depend on the
intentionality to encode the information, and thus, could be reliant on
more controlled processing (Kern et al., 2005; Talmi et al., 2007).
Last, our results extend the ﬁndings of Knott et al. (2018) and show
that speeded word presentation and thus reduced attention, adversely
impacted false memories for negative and positive non-arousing sti-
muli. For non-arousing valenced information, reduced attentional re-
sources interferes with the rehearsal and elaboration process and
thereby impacts false memory for the non-arousing emotional stimuli.
That is, for a false memory for a critical lure to occur, the associative
links between concepts/nodes need to be activated. If speeded pre-
sentation prevents the controlled encoding of non-arousing valenced
stimuli, the associative links cannot be activated. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the neuroimaging studies and previous behavioral stu-
dies, which have shown that, for non-arousing emotion-enhanced
memories, whether negative or positive, rely on the PFC-hippocampal
network associated with controlled processing (e.g., Kang et al., 2014).
In contrast, Experiment 2, the between-participants design, showed
that while correct recognition of list items decreased, false memories
increased with reduced attention. This ﬁnding is more in line with
Pérez-Mata et al. (2002) and Seamon et al. (1998), who also found
higher false memory rates in divided attention and speeded presenta-
tion conditions. We argue that these ﬁndings reﬂect a change in deci-
sion criteria whereby participants set a lower threshold for accepting an
item as old because they know words will appear less familiar to them
after studying items in a speeded presentation condition. This is sup-
ported by signal detection analysis with participants appearing to adopt
a more liberal response criterion for accepting the critical lures as old.
Of note, these ﬁndings are similar to those reported by Stretch and
Wixted (1998; see also Wixted & Stretch, 2000), who investigated ex-
perimental design using a levels of processing task. When strength was
manipulated between lists, false alarms were low for the strong list
condition because participants used a high criterion (strong belief they
could accurately recognize a word) and could avoid making false
alarms without missing many targets. With the weak list condition,
false alarms were high because the criterion was set low to maximize
the probability of giving a correct answer in light of items not feeling as
familiar. Stretch and Wixted (1998) argued that participants used a
kind of metaknowledge to set their decision criterion. The results from
Experiment 2 support this suggestion. Participants adopted a more
liberal response in the fast presentation condition because words did
not feel as familiar to them. In order to increase the probability of ac-
curately recognizing a word, they adopted a more liberal criterion. The
slow presentation condition allows for processing of the list items, and
strategies for making old and new decisions can occur as normal. In
contrast, for Experiment 1, where participants were tested on items at
recognition that were presented both fast and slow at study, there was
no shift in criterion and participants used the same response criterion
for accepting old and new words for all recognition items (critical lures
and list items) associated with each encoding condition. We see the
pattern of results that we do for Experiment 1 because the decision for
accepting an item as old is set high for items known to be encoded with
comparatively less detail than those encoded with rich detail. This
means that fewer critical lure items are considered as familiar (because
they were not encoded) and thus do not meet the threshold for re-
cognition. Negative high arousing items were automatically encoded so
the level of familiarity is the same and thus, the threshold for accepting
these as old words is similar.
We propose this explanation because our signal detection analysis
showed a change in criterion C between the fast and slow presentation
for critical lures and list items in each experimental design. Previous
studies that have manipulated divided attention at encoding have
varied in design, however, Dewhurst et al. (2007), and Knott et al.
(2018) used a repeated measures design, similar to our ﬁrst experiment,
and found a reduction in false memory formation. Peters et al. (2008),
Otgaar et al. (2012, for adults), and Pérez-Mata et al. (2002) used be-
tween-participants designs and found an increase in false memory
formation. Only Peters et al. reported response bias with no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in attention conditions. However, their recognition test was a
ﬁnal test that followed free recall tests after each list, thus, the re-
cognition data and analysis is not directly comparable because the re-
cognition test is confounded by the recollection of the items from the
individual recall tasks. It should be noted here that our recognition
tasks in Experiment 1 and 2, did diﬀer in item length (72 vs 46 items
respectively). Although it could be argued that fewer items on the re-
cognition test would make the task easier, you would expect the op-
posite impact on criterion shift. That is, research has shown that when
the recall/recognition task is harder, participants adopt a more liberal
criterion to account for the diﬃcult of recognizing list items. This is not
what we found. Further, previous research has shown the eﬀect with a
wide variation in item length (Knott et al., 2018; Knott & Shah, in press,
used a 60 and 120 item recognition test respectively) and found the
same eﬀect. Although future work may be needed to rectify this, we
believe this demonstrates that recognition item length does not impact
the eﬀect found with regard to the attention and emotion manipulations
used in this study.
As noted, in Experiment 2, participant’s response bias in the speeded
condition shifted to more liberal responses in all ﬁve list emotion
conditions. However, in both speed conditions, the results suggest an
emotional enhanced false memory eﬀect that is driven by arousal. That
is, higher false memories for negative-arousing lists compared to other
list types. Several emotion enhanced memory theories attribute the
eﬀect largely to arousal (Adelman & Estes, 2013). The underlying as-
sumption is that limited mnemonic resources are preferentially allo-
cated to behaviorally signiﬁcant stimuli (Nairne, 2010), with arousal
acting as their primary index (McGaugh, 2000). In contrast, valence,
independent of arousal, is believed to exert a lesser inﬂuence on
memory (Mather & Sutherland, 2009). By this account, memory en-
hancement can occur for both negative and positive materials, provided
they are suﬃciently arousing (Adelman & Estes, 2013). Based on pre-
vious research, a theoretical explanation for the impact of valence and
arousal on the formation of false memories will need further con-
sideration. As mentioned earlier, Brainerd and Boofkbinder (in press),
with reference to the Fuzzy-Trace theory, argue that arousal does not
contribute substantially to valence eﬀects found in the DRM paradigm.
They argue that the diﬀerential eﬀect of valence occurs because nega-
tive, in comparison to positive stimuli have fewer properties that sup-
port item-speciﬁc processing (known to enhance true memory). Their
ﬁndings and conclusions contradict those found here. Overall, we ﬁnd
that arousing negative stimuli produce more false memories than
nonarousing negative stimuli. Something that Brainerd and Bookbinder
would not predict. Referring to associative activation theories (Howe
et al., 2009), we argue that high arousing valenced lists have dense and
highly salient semantic connections which allow the spread of activa-
tion to occur rapidly and automatically through a network. when the
stimuli also evoke arousal, it attracts attention which enhances memory
binding (Talmi, 2013) and increases activations to the nonpresented
critical lure. We have seen here that this attention capture can be re-
latively automatic. Of course, we have not explicitly tested either
theory, and how valence and arousal contribute to the formation of
false memories will require further research.
To conclude, we had two main goals in this research. First and
foremost, we wanted to extend the ﬁndings of Knott et al. (2018) and
use behavioral data to make inferences about the role of automatic and
controlled processing when encoding stimuli manipulated for valence
and arousal. Second, we wanted to explore some of the contradictory
ﬁndings in relation to the eﬀect of reduced or divided attention on false
memory formation and the possibility that this was a result of a re-
luctance to change decision criteria during the course of a single re-
cognition test. In Experiment 1, where participants were tested on items
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at recognition that were presented both fast and slow at study, there
was no shift in criterion and participants used the same response cri-
terion for accepting old and new words for all recognition items. With
all things being equal in this design, few attentional resources are
needed for the activation of associative connections and the formation
of false memories for high arousing negative stimuli. In contrast,
speeded presentation prevented the encoding of non-arousing valenced
stimuli and positive arousing stimuli and thus, hindered the activation
of associative links and reduced false memory formation. In Experiment
2, participants adopted a more liberal response in the fast presentation
condition because they knew words would be less familiar to them. In
order to increase the probability of accurately recognizing a word, they
adopted a more liberal criterion. Thus, although we saw the overall
enhanced false memory eﬀect for negative arousing stimuli, we saw an
increase in false memories in the reduced attention encoding condition
because the response bias set at retrieval superseded the role of en-
coding processes during study. This ﬁnal conclusion draws out two
important issues. First, the role of arousal in false memory formation.
Overall it appears that false memory rates are higher for negative
arousing compared to negative non-arousing stimuli. This conﬂicts with
a recent ﬁnding and explanation outlined by Brainerd and Boofkbinder
(in press) who argued that arousal does not aﬀect false memory. Fur-
ther research is needed to unpick these conﬂicting ﬁndings and the role
of attention and automaticity of processing could be key. Finally, when
it comes to attention, we should be mindful of the impact experimental
design has on changes to our decision strategies.
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Appendix A. Overall mean values for lists and critical lures as a function of list set, list emotion and list variables.
List set A List set B
Valence Arousal BAS Valence Arousal BAS
Lists LI CL LI CL Lists LI CL LI CL
Negative/high
Anger 2.86 2.34 6.64 7.63 0.15 Hate 2.40 2.12 6.04 6.95 0.16
Bomb 3.56 2.10 6.50 7.15 0.16 Gun 3.15 3.47 5.93 7.02 0.30
Snake 2.99 3.31 5.97 6.82 0.26 Pain 2.67 2.13 5.62 6.50 0.30
Evil 2.44 3.23 5.72 6.39 0.10 Danger 4.01 2.95 5.83 7.32 0.12
Thief 2.74 2.13 5.81 6.89 0.14 Drugs 3.43 3.76 5.56 6.00 0.17
Bees 3.60 3.20 5.31 6.51 0.31 Stress 3.11 2.09 6.45 7.45 0.10
Grand means 3.03 2.72 5.99 6.90 0.19 Grand means 3.13 2.75 5.90 6.87 0.19
Negative/low
Alone 2.56 2.41 3.67 4.83 0.17 Sad 2.55 1.61 4.31 4.13 0.26
Sick 3.22 1.90 5.00 4.29 0.32 Fat 3.99 2.28 4.29 4.81 0.16
Stupid 3.62 2.31 4.59 4.72 0.23 Smoke 3.86 3.39 4.76 4.48 0.20
Trash 3.14 2.67 4.53 4.16 0.17 Cold 4.00 4.02 4.65 5.19 0.26
Wrong 3.60 2.93 4.62 4.67 0.17 Boring 4.18 3.38 4.32 2.29 0.12
Old 3.72 3.31 4.20 3.50 0.28 Poor 2.83 2.28 4.78 5.21 0.18
Grand means 3.31 2.59 4.43 4.36 0.22 Grand means 3.57 2.83 4.52 4.35 0.20
Positive/high
Laugh 7.96 8.36 6.35 7.39 0.28 Love 7.78 8.72 6.29 6.44 0.32
Win 7.78 8.38 6.09 7.72 0.17 Pretty 7.68 7.75 5.99 6.03 0.13
Beach 6.97 8.03 5.12 5.53 0.17 Gold 6.99 7.54 5.46 5.76 0.16
Sweet 6.59 7.64 5.16 5.96 0.19 Happy 7.68 8.21 6.35 6.49 0.32
Party 7.28 7.86 6.07 6.69 0.16 Trip 7.02 6.96 6.06 6.30 0.16
Money 7.47 7.59 6.33 5.70 0.29 God 6.95 8.15 5.76 5.95 0.17
Grand means 7.34 7.98 5.85 6.50 0.21 Grand means 7.35 7.89 5.98 6.16 0.21
Positive/low
Sleep 6.40 7.20 3.66 2.80 0.35 Flower 6.44 6.64 4.15 4.00 0.37
Calm 6.70 6.73 3.70 3.60 0.10 Safe 6.89 7.07 3.91 3.86 0.10
Fruit 6.05 6.93 4.21 4.63 0.25 Bird 6.71 7.27 4.48 3.17 0.38
Blue 6.08 6.76 4.55 4.31 0.19 Girl 6.23 6.87 4.66 4.29 0.17
Art 5.91 6.68 4.25 4.86 0.17 Bath 5.89 7.33 4.73 4.16 0.10
Earth 6.18 7.15 4.61 4.24 0.13 Music 6.35 8.13 4.57 5.32 0.23
Grand means 6.22 6.91 4.16 4.07 0.20 Grand means 6.42 7.22 4.42 4.13 0.22
Neutral
Cup 5.18 5.44 4.25 3.70 0.14 Window 4.70 5.91 4.27 3.97 0.20
Foot 5.53 5.02 4.24 3.27 0.23 Paper 4.99 5.20 3.77 2.50 0.25
Rock 5.05 5.56 4.36 4.52 0.25 Street 5.10 5.22 4.64 3.39 0.24
Chair 5.24 5.08 3.76 3.15 0.27 Hammer 5.22 4.88 4.62 4.58 0.16
Tire 5.44 4.97 4.89 4.00 0.12 Number 5.19 5.55 4.49 4.34 0.21
Milk 5.36 5.95 4.17 3.68 0.23 Time 5.15 5.31 4.09 4.64 0.21
Grand means 5.30 5.34 4.44 3.72 0.21 Grand means 5.06 5.35 4.31 3.90 0.21
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2019.03.010.
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